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Abstract
This article aims to examine the importance of an often overlooked argument when it comes to 
explaining why great powers go to war against a weaker actor. This argument involves great power 
status considerations. The article argues that states care deeply about their status, especially states 
which are current and former great powers, and would opt to go to war to preserve this status 
even if the political and military consequences of such intervention are negligible to objective 
observers. To illustrate this argument, I will be looking at why the British decided to reestablish 
their sovereignty over the Falklands in 1982. The empirical part of the analysis is based on formerly 
secret documents declassified by the British government. This qualitative primary analysis of British 
documents provides new insights about the crisis and suggests that status considerations played a 
large role in the British decision to re-conquer the Falklands.
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Introduction
In 2010, the British government began declassifying documents related 
to the Falklands crisis (1982). These documents are now available on the 
Margaret Thatcher Foundation website. They are related to the negotiations 
with Argentina and cover the crucial period 1979-1982, when the situation 
spiraled out of control and ended up in a military conflict. These documents 
are largely comprised of reports from the cabinet’s internal discussions as 
well as communications from the Falklands’ governor. They offer a great 
deal of information on how the British government perceived the Falklands 
issue; they also provide information on how the island’s residents perceived 
their situation and also the pivotal role of Argentinean public opinion.
It is important to analyze these newly declassified documents to confirm 
the relevance of previously applied theories to explain why negotiations 
failed and war ensued 32 years after the fact. The Falklands crisis also 
had other consequences that still stand today: the islands’ sovereignty 
continues to be an important issue for Argentina and the United Kingdom 
to such an extent that the UK organized a referendum in 2012 to ask the 
islanders if they wanted to remain British. The result was 99.8% in favor of a 
British citizenship (Falkland Islands Government 2013). As soon as the results 
were revealed, Buenos Aires qualified it as illegal and argued that the 
islands belong to Argentina. London has permanently deployed fighter 
squadrons to ensure air superiority in that region and to - de facto - deter 
Argentina from invading the islands again. The aim of this article is not to 
explain the conflict itself, but rather to provide an explanatory model as 
to why Britain decided to risk its entire navy and international prestige to 
re-conquer remote islands in the South Atlantic.
Literature review
Many books and articles are dedicated to the Falklands crisis. This 
abundant literature can be divided into three major categories. (1) The 
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first is made up of works from decision-makers involved in the conflict 
(Thatcher 1993; Haig 1984; Weinberger 1990; Costa Méndez 1993; 
Menéndez 1983) and from officers and soldiers who were deployed on 
the battlefield (Woodward 1992; Thompson 1992; Piaggi 1998; Bramley 
1993; Lawrence and Lawrence 1988). 
(2) The second category in the literature is composed of historical works. 
A part of this cohort describes and presents the conduct of the war and 
of military operations (Adkin 1995; Gordon 1989; Middlebrook 1985 and 
1989; Schmitt and Green 1985; Calvert 1982; Hastings and Jenkins 1983). 
Another part focuses on describing the value proposition bargain from 
a factual point of view and how the crisis was (mis) managed by the 
two sides, but with very little convincing theoretical evidence developed 
(Freedman 1982 and 1988; Williams 1983). Douglas Kinney also takes this 
perspective but offers an explanation as to why the two sides couldn’t find 
any peaceful resolution to the dispute prior to the conflict. His argument 
is that no agreement was reached due to the view of the world the two 
countries had and their lack of imagination in finding a mutually face-
saving compromise. In addition, there are studies about the legal aspects 
of the conflict in relation to international law (Calvert 1983; Windsor 1983; 
Schmitt and Green 1985; Franck 1983; Bluth 1987; Perl and Larson 1983).
(3) The third category is composed of academic works. Most of them 
concentrate on explaining the Argentine decision to invade the Falklands 
(Welch 1997 and 2005). The most common argument is the diversionary 
theory of war: Jack Levy and Lily Vakili (1992) highlight the impact and 
decisive importance that the Argentine domestic and social situation had 
on the Junta and on its desire to recover the island to salvage its political 
leadership.1 Other scholars defend the idea of mutual misperceptions 
(Paul 1994; Rotberg and Rubb 1984). However, there are very few studies 
that explain the Falklands conflict from the British side. One of the most 
notable works is that of Virginia Gamba (1987) but unfortunately, her work 
presents more the general international and political context in which 
Britain was from 1945 to 1982 and not the actual British motivation to go 
to war. The most widely accepted theoretical argument is that Thatcher 
took the decision to re-conquer the Falklands in order to save her political 
1  To go to war to distract domestic opinion from domestic shifts in order to gain public support and ultimately win the 
next elections (Sobek 2007).
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career and shift the focus away from her domestic policies. With only 
access to the conflict timelines and studies of the British domestic context, 
the argument of diversionary war appears to be relevant and tempting 
to accept. However, a detailed study of declassified documents proves 
that both Thatcher and her government were not particularly concerned 
by the outcome of the next elections when they took the decision to send 
the entire Royal Navy on 5 April.
Other IR scholars, particularly Richard Ned Lebow (1983) and David 
McCourt (2014) have argued that Britain reacted this way to the 
Argentine invasion because of prestige factors (Lebow) and national 
identity considerations (McCourt). These arguments seem closer to reality, 
but they suffer still from some limitations. Lebow’s work is flawed from 
evidence limitations as recognized by the author himself: “in the absence 
of these documents the investigator can only piece together the outlines 
of the story from evidence available at this time [speeches, interviews, 
newspapers account]” (Lebow 1983). The available documents in 1983 
are problematic to use because when it comes to speeches, interviews 
and newspapers reports, we cannot be certain if what is said and written 
is accurate and reflects real motivations or is an expression of the way 
politicians want the audience to understand a given situation. The other 
concern is that it explains the conflict from a crisis management point 
of view and emphasizes miscalculations, but barely provides theoretical 
explanations as to the reason why miscalculations occurred. However, his 
claim that prestige and status considerations played an important role 
in the British decision to go to war is a solid conclusion as this study will 
show. McCourt’s work takes several key events involving Britain (the Suez 
crisis, the Skybolt affair, the Falklands’ crisis) and demonstrates how Britain 
constructed its role during these events, based on the use of George 
Herbert Mead’s concepts of role-taking, role-playing, and alter-casting. 
However, his work does not directly examine the British government’s 
motivations to go to war against Argentina. 
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Theoretical section
Why would this research be different from those already existing? Firstly, 
because I rely primarily on declassified documents to base my claims (see 
the data collection part for more details), which enable me to have a 
clear insight into the British decision-making process and mindset at that 
time. Based on this evidence, I will make the argument that the British 
motivation to retake the Falklands was essentially based on status and 
prestige considerations.
Great power status and its implications
Defining great power and great power status
The term “great power” was first used in 1815 during the Vienna Congress 
to name states having the responsibility to create and sustain international 
rules (Nolan 2006: 72). Since 1815, the terminology of “great power” 
is often used in IR to name the most important and powerful countries. 
When it comes to providing criteria to identify great powers, there is a 
strong tendency use only material criteria, such as economic and military 
power: “a great power, almost by definition, is one which has the capacity 
to control events beyond its own borders; and that is usually based on 
the ability to use military force” (Howard 1971: 254; Rothstein 1968; Levy 
1983; Modelski and Morgan 1985; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Baron 2013; 
Mearsheimer 2014). However, this understanding is too limited: focusing on 
military power and economic power, although important, is not enough 
(Duque 2015). To give a more accurate definition of what a great power is, 
identification criteria should rather be based on the three types of power 
identified by Robert Dahl (1957), Steven Lukes (1974), and Michael Barnett 
and Raymond Duvall (2005). These three aspects of power can be found 
in Manjeet Pardesi’s recent works. In his article “Is India a Great power? 
Understanding Great Power status” (2015), he explains that great powers 
are countries having security and economic related interests outside of 
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the home region, that they have capabilities to promote their interests 
and that finally they have seen their aspirations to be considered as great 
powers recognised. Based on this, it seems to be more accurate to define 
a great power as a state possessing the five following characteristics: 
(1) having interests (economic, strategic, diplomatic or cultural) in other 
region(s) than its home region and being able to prevent other actors 
from following policies harmful to its interests or to compel others to bow 
to some extend to its interests; (2) then a great power is also a country 
having both the resolve and capabilities to be active on the international 
stage (promoting initiatives, imposing norms/rules of conduct, controlling 
the agenda and taking the lead to find solutions to global issues). A great 
power is a state having resolve/will/willpower and because of that will not 
be irresolute about its behaviours and policies. A great power is, therefore, 
an active state and influential on the international stage, a state that offers 
solutions to international issues. Although successful outcomes are more 
desirable, failures, to some extent, are inevitable; what is important is the 
level of activity deployed by the state; (3) a great power is also a country 
enjoying freedom of action on the international stage, having a certain 
level of autonomy to take foreign policy decisions or to resort to the use of 
military force; (4) Finally, it is a country that has been granted the status of 
a great power by other international actors, meaning that this country has 
been recognised to possess the previous criteria. The two essential criteria 
are number 2 and number 4: willingness to be active on the international 
stage and to assume special responsibilities, and recognition from other 
actors. 
Status can be defined as “the rank an actor occupies in a given social 
group” (Onea 2014: 129) and has at its core the notion of social groups’ 
consensus about the position an actor has in a given hierarchy (Dafoe, 
Rensthen and Huth 2014). “Status often hold ‘social roles’, such as being 
dominant within a group, having moral authority within a group, being the 
leader of a coalition, or being the defender of a group of people” (Dafoe 
et al. 2014: 374). A given position in a hierarchy has prescribed duties, 
functions to be performed, and rights to be enjoyed. Great power status 
is a very particular type of status, because it goes along with expected 
higher task performances and a better ability to resolve regional and 
international issues (Forsberg, Heller and Wolf 2014: 263-264). Since the 
Vienna Congress (1814-1815) great powers have attributed themselves 
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with, and the international community has recognised the existence of a 
specific responsibility: to prevent further war from breaking out, as well as 
to tackle future international crises (Battistella 2012: 663). Special duties 
embodied in the status of a great power have changed according to the 
global context. The first special duty was to maintain the balance of power 
and to defend states’ right to have an independent existence (Nolan 
2006: 74). This first task has been gradually extended to the preservation 
of the actual order: that is to say preventing physical aggression (Morris 
2011) but also preventing (and punishing) aggression in contravention of 
international law (Jackson 2000: 202). In exchange for responsibilities at 
the global stage and status, great powers must prove their commitment 
to fulfil these expectations, even if it is costly (Bukovansky et al. 2012; Nolan 
2006). Great power status provides privileges: states enjoying it cannot be 
ignored in resolving international issues and when it comes to negotiating 
agreements, the supposed gap of power between the great power and 
its counter-parts makes the weaker actor agree to the great power’s 
terms (Aron 1962: 68). More generally, “the group is more reticent to 
impose, it makes requests more carefully, and it offers various public signs 
of respect” (O’Neill 2001: 139). Claimed status has to be recognised by 
others to be fully enjoyed. The recognition process is therefore a two-step 
process: self-recognition and then recognition by others. In this process I 
identify three components, called the ‘three circles of recognition’.
Attaining and retaining great power status: a 
Sisyphean task
The three step process to earning great power status
When a country consistently fulfils the great powers’ criteria elaborated 
above, its leaders/ruling elites and its citizens start to believe their country 
is special; and because their country is special, they should be considered 
differently from other countries. A feeling of superiority, or at least an 
impression of being different from and unique compared to others 
enhances national self-esteem. There are two clearly defined groups of 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
134
states: all the others and their country. To ordinary people as well as to 
ruling elites, it is unthinkable that their country could be anything less than 
a great power. The great power status recognition starts, therefore, by 
self-recognition/attribution of this particular status. This step is essential. 
If leaders/ruling elites are not convinced their country is a great power, 
how could they ask others to grant them this status? To make use of a 
comparison from theatre: an actor needs to believe he is the character 
he will be playing during the theatre play. If the actor is not persuaded 
he is indeed the character he will be playing, then the audience will 
notice and refuse to acknowledge that it is anything more than a theatre 
play. The insistence that their country should be seen as a great power 
and granted privileges and prestige linked to that position becomes a 
key element of a state’s foreign policy until full international recognition 
occurs (Forsberg, Heller and Wolf 2014: 262). Self-attribution of status is, of 
course, necessary in the quest for this status, but it is not sufficient. What 
is lacking is being recognised by others. The state needs the approval of 
others to achieve status. They are used by the state as a mirror on which its 
image is reflected: “social status rests on collective judgment, or rather a 
consensus of opinion within a group. No one can by himself confer status 
on another, and if a man’s social position were assessed differently by 
everybody he met, he would have no social status at all” (Marshall 1977: 
198 quoted in Paul et al. 2014: 8). Approval of two other circles- evolving 
states enjoying different status - is required. 
The second circle is composed of actors already enjoying the sought 
after status, that is to say in this case the second circle is composed of 
other great powers. When a country is believed to perform the role(s) and 
to satisfy most of the great power criteria, it is recognised by other great 
powers as a member of their “club”. At its beginning, “the great power 
system was rather like a British gentleman’s club, with admission controlled 
by the existing members. If established great powers begin to treat 
another state as one of their members, that country ipso facto became 
a great power” (Scott 2006: 119). The decision to co-opt new members 
by already recognised great powers is rather a subjective process than 
an objective one based only on material criteria. Co-optation, indeed, 
means, more or less, being the same, having the same characteristics as 
others have. Actors who are already members of a group impose their 
views, goals and behaviours and potential members have to follow these 
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rules in order to become members of the group. Recognition/co-optation 
by the second circle is important: high status group members (other great 
powers) are more prominent and influential in their opinion and their 
help is sought more often; their actions and behaviours draw particular 
attention and their positions taken and policies carry more weight than 
those of other actors (de Waal, Gregg and Lammers 2015: 447). This step 
is a good achievement but is only partial because the group of great 
powers is a small sample of actors (normally no more than ten countries). 
Of course, being recognised by great powers as being a pre-condition of 
great power legitimacy, it still needs a stronger stimulus. It needs support 
(recognition) from the remaining actors. To achieve full recognition, a 
country needs to see its status recognised by a bigger group, that is to say 
the international community.
The international community is the third and last circle. Status recognition 
from the third circle usually follows the recognition from the second circle, 
because international actors tend to mirror what great powers do. For 
example, when great powers decide to open an embassy in a state’s 
capital city or to recognize the existence of a new country, other countries 
tend to mirror this decision. The third circle exhibits most of the time the 
behaviour of an audience during a theatre play. During a theatre play, 
the audience can consider or not the performance as appropriate (well 
performed) and confirms the reality of the role. The third circle has exactly 
this function. It watches the second circle acting and gives the status of 
great power to states performing the way great powers should. That does 
not mean that countries belonging to the third circle cannot develop 
autonomous foreign policies. It simply means they do not have much 
impact on world politics. These countries have barely any capabilities and 
are therefore out of play (Badie 2013: 84). However, if the third circle is not 
convinced by the performance, it may stop treating the state as a great 
power. The way the third circle behaves toward a great power is a sort of 
reality-testing. The image of great power a state gives is tested, evaluated 
by the third circle against observations of the great power’s behaviour 
on the international stage. Once status is achieved and recognised, the 
quest for status does not really end, like Sisyphus constantly trying to roll 
a boulder up to a hill, only to watch it rolling back down, repeating this 
action again and again.
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The importance of appropriate status signalling
To keep great power status, those who attributed to have it must 
believe the state continues to meet the required criteria in producing an 
appropriate status signalling. This demands constant efforts, “the whole 
group has an inducement to pressure the individual to behave correctly” 
(O’Neill 2001: 91). Great power status has been granted because the state 
was perceived as being legitimate in having the capabilities required and 
resolve to take roles associated with great power status. A great power’s 
legitimacy to be a great power is compared not only to other members 
of the group, but it is also compared to the great power’s past. Other 
great powers’ capabilities and behaviour and the state’s past are used 
as reference points in which symbols often play an important role: “status-
seeking actions can be largely symbolic and aimed at influencing other’s 
perceptions” (Welch Larson and Schevchenko 2010: 5). When these 
efforts cannot be afforded for a long time, or if wrong and inappropriate 
status signalling actions are sent, then it can encourage the second and 
third circles to stop perceiving a country as being a great power, and 
in this case great power status and correlated rights are put at stake. 
Inappropriate or wrong status signalling can take several aspects. Firstly, 
it can take a material shape (e.g. the reduction of the size of the military 
or of its budget) for various reasons. Then, inappropriate and wrong status 
signalling can also take a more informal aspect. In this case, all is based on 
assumptions and perceptions: for some reasons a great power is alleged 
to be less efficient and influential in its role(s); as a result, its will of being and 
acting as a great power is questioned. This second type of inappropriate 
status signalling tends to be harder to deal with because everything is 
based on perceptions and interpretations of a given behaviour.
A country suspected to be sending inappropriate status signals can 
endure status uncertainty. The second and third circle (and sometimes 
even the country’s domestic opinion) start to have doubts about the real 
capacities of the country to be a true great power. Status uncertainty, if not 
addressed quickly, tends often to lead to what is called ‘the recognition 
denial’ (Lindemann 2010). The recognition denial is the gap between the 
claimed frame and the frame perceived by others. There is recognition 
denial when the image a state has of itself is higher than the image given 
back by others. The more important the gap is, the stronger feelings of 
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frustration (and even humiliation) are (Lindemann 2010: 51). Status denial 
tends to lead to an increase of challenges and what is perceived as 
provocation by the state facing status uncertainty as the fear factor 
included in great power status is eroding. In this sense, challenges are 
a symbolic demand of a proof of great power. To avoid status denial, 
the state must “demonstrate their possession of qualities that warrant their 
acceptance” (Lebow 2010: 94). If the challenged great power responds 
to the challenge(s) in a satisfying manner, the challenges might stop. 
But if not, then challenges might continue until the imposture is revealed 
to all. Hence the need to make the second and third circles to see the 
state as a great power. The shape of actions to take can differ, but it 
“often requires publicly incurring some cost or risk, often by participating 
in violence” (O’Neill 2001: 91). 
What happens in the case of a challenge from a weaker actor? Being 
challenged (or worse attacked) by a weaker actor is humiliating because 
the simple fact to be a great power should deter weaker actors from 
challenging the state. The fact that an inferior actor challenges a 
great power is deeply humiliating: it provokes anger when a challenge 
“comes from an actor who lacks the standing to challenge or insult us 
[...]. Great powers feel enraged if challenged by such a state” (Lebow 
2008: 69). This challenge can create doubts about the reality of the great 
power status. The expected behaviour from a great power is to put the 
inferior actor back in its place. If this expected task is not performed (or 
performed with difficulties), questions will arise about the legitimacy of the 
state claiming great power status. As noted by Bevan Sewell and Maria 
Ryan: “once the symbol [of weakness] was created, there was no turning 
back” (Sewell and Ryan 2017: 293). The challenged great power may be 
sending inappropriate status signals (cuts in the arm forces, diplomatic 
difficulties to weigh on the international stage, retreat from world affairs, 
etc.) In this scenario, the situation can quickly become difficult. The 
challenged state will have to decide between attempting to punish the 
challenger to send an appropriate status signal and thus taking the risk to 
publicly fail because it has no more capabilities to do so. Or, the state can 
decide not to react to the challenge, making clear that the second and 
third circles were right to interpret its signals as inappropriate for a great 
power. The dilemma for states facing status uncertainty is the following: to 
maintain great power status, the challenger has to be punished severely 
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(and decisively), but taking the decision to go to war can lead to a 
more damaging consequence in the case of a failure: a great power 
defeated militarily by a weaker actor would be very embarrassing. First, 
because of the defeat but also because intervening in peripheral regions 
has important symbolic aspects. A challenge in the periphery may have 
zero effect on vital interests, but is highly symbolic: “when engaged in a 
conflict for global stakes, what may appear as a marginal interest will be 
invested with a significance it would not otherwise have, for almost any 
challenge is to be seen by the challenger and by third parties as a test of 
one’s will” (Tucker 1981: 144-145 quoted in O’Neill 2001: 105). 
Methodology
Research design
The research instrument I use to analyse the declassified documents is 
discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is defined as the “qualitative and 
interpretative recovery of meaning from the language that actors use 
to describe and understand social phenomena” (Abdelal et al. 2009: 6). 
It is in speeches and in written documents that perceptions of a given 
situation can be found. For example, if it appears that status and prestige 
considerations are the cause of the decision to go to war, then words 
or idioms expressing these ideas should be found in documents before 
the decision to go to war is taken. However, there are two major risks in 
applying the discourse analysis method to leaders’ discourses and writings. 
The first one is: how can we be sure that what is said or written by leaders is 
the truth? This risk has been highlighted by Paul Saurette (2007), and many 
others. Saurette studied the motives George Bush had when he took the 
decision to invade Iraq in 2003. They were basing their analyses on public 
discourses Bush made. When studying public discourses, it must be taken 
into account that these discourses are addressed to domestic public 
opinion as well as to international public opinion, while books written by 
politicians are often used as justification a posteriori. I mitigate this risk in 
the data collection section, where I explain that I have selected mainly 
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declassified documents as sources. 
Declassified documents enable us to avoid the first risk because they 
give us unique insights from the decision-making processes. As the 
documents were first designed to remain classified, there is less risk that 
what is written is untrue. The second risk is lying about “hidden interests”. 
How to affirm that what is assigned to emotions, identities, perceptions is 
not a useful mask to hide material interests? It is mitigated too by the use 
of declassified documents. Indeed, they give insights into the decision-
making process leading to war and therefore, reveal what were thoughts 
and considerations of decision-makers at the time the decision was taken. 
Maybe there are material interests but the documents would reveal 
that these material interests did not matter to them. These documents 
would also reveal whether decision-makers were conscious or not of the 
potential existence of material interests.
Data collection
A series of documents on the Falkland crisis have been declassified since 
2010 by the British government and published on the Margaret Thatcher 
foundation’s website.2 These documents are very valuable because they 
consist of transcripts of both the secret and public negotiations between 
Argentina and Britain, of reports to the British Government from the 
Falklands Governor, of reports from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of 
the Argentine public and of government opinions regarding the issue. The 
documents also consist of personal notes to Margaret Thatcher from her 
advisers, and even more valuable, most of these notes are annotated by 
Thatcher herself, which enables one to have a good idea on how she was 
perceiving the situation. As a result, these declassified documents give the 
opportunity to know what happened behind the stage; as politicians do 
not always show the same considerations in public or in secrecy. In total 
1.840 documents related to the Falklands war have been declassified 
and published by the British government. I actually limited myself to 328 of 
these documents as this paper is focused on the decision to go to war and 
not on what happened after the decision to respond was taken and the 
Navy received the order to sail to the South Atlantic. That is why I studied 
2 For each document quoted, the reader will find the access link in the references. 
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and analyzed only the documents from 10 May 1979 (the first declassified 
document was issued at this date) to 7 April 982 (debates at Parliament 
after the fleet departed). The documents used are classified as follows.
Table 1: classification of the British sources.
Type of documents Number of documents
Reports regarding the history of the Falklands’ dispute 8
Propositions for future policy in the Falklands 4
Comments on future policies by ministers 6
Documents related to UK-Argentine negotiations (including direct 
messages from UK ministers to Argentine ministers and vice versa 21
Minutes between ministers 73
Documents issued by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to 
ministers. 23
FCO to UK embassy in Buenos Aires 23
Minutes and letters to Margaret Thatcher (MT) 43
Letters from MT to FCO 13
Reports on the situation in Argentina (on the economy, military and 
political situation, including Argentine press opinion) 17
Reports on discussions during Defense and Overseas Policy Committee 14
Reports from Ministry of Defense (MOD) to FCO 6
Public interventions of MT 6
FCO to Port Stainley 8
Letters from and to the governor of the Falklands 9
UK-US talks (excluding Haig’s letters) 10
Reports on British ministers’ visits to the Falklands 2
Reports to the Cabinet on the House of Common’s position 2
Minutes to the Cabinet 7
Reports from the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires 31
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The hypothesis derived from the theoretical considerations I made 
previously is that great powers perceived as being in decline will respond 
to an aggression in their periphery by the use of the military force in order 
to maintain their state’s status. If this hypothesis is correct, then discussions, 
speeches or notes evoking the place of the country on the international 
stage should be found within the declassified documents. The table below 
gives some examples of words and expressions (in bold) found in the 
declassified documents and linked to the theory previously explained.3 
Table 2: examples of expressions supporting my theoretical claims 
Hypothesis Verification
Restoring prestige and 
great power’s identity
 - “the significance of the Falklands was enormous […] for our 
standing in the world”
 - “since the Suez fiasco […] we had come to be seen […] as 
a nation, which lacked the will and capability to defend its 
interests […] victory in the Falklands change that”
 - “a British readiness to surrender sovereignty over the Falklands 
might have implications for the British positions […]”
Case-study: Britain confronted in the Falklands’ 
crisis
The analysis of the case-study of the British decision to go to war to re-
conquer the Falklands Islands aims to highlight the role status considerations 
and emotions played. This section is organised as follows: in the first part, 
I will recall elements that show Britain was facing great power status 
denial; then, in the second part and based on a qualitative analysis of 
declassified documents, I will highlight that status considerations and the 
desire to be recognised again as a great power played an important role 
in the British decision to go to war.
3 Only documents providing the most relevant examples will be directly quoted in this paper. 
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The remaining consequences of Suez: is Britain still legitimately 
claiming great power status?
From Suez to the Falklands: a succession of embarrassing military issues
The Suez fiasco in 1956 had a disastrous impact on British prestige. It also 
had an impact on how British citizens were seeing their country in the 
world and the place they thought Britain had on the international stage. 
Before Suez, they were persuaded that their country was on the same 
level as the USA and the USSR: they thought they could compete with 
these states. After all the United Kingdom was the only European country 
involved from the beginning until the end of the Second World War and 
which successfully prevented a Nazi invasion (Marx 1993; Chassaigne 
2009). After the end of WWII and despite its economic and industrial 
weaknesses, British diplomacy managed to create the impression 
that Britain was the only country which could bridge the differences 
between the US and the USSR: the UK was the country to which European 
countries should be close to in order to be connected to the US and 
the country to which the US should be linked to if they wanted to keep 
good relations with European states and also with the Soviets. But Suez 
changed everything; the image that the UK was a great power literally 
exploded. The British had to withdraw from the Suez Canal because of US 
and USSR pressures (Moscow even threatened to use nuclear weapons 
and Washington launched a financial offensive on the British Pound). 
The Suez failed expeditions revealed two weaknesses Britain had: first, 
that its conventional forces were not adapted and were using outdated 
WWII equipment (Robbins 2013). Secondly, without nuclear weapons, 
the UK was vulnerable to international pressures, especially from US and 
Soviet pressure.
Since the end of WII, Britain had seen its military capacities decrease. Britain 
had no nuclear weapons and a solution to change that was to buy nuclear 
systems from the US (the Polaris missiles for submarines). However, this 
solution appeared to be extremely costly and had consequences on the 
defence budget: the choice was either obtaining a deterrence capability 
or developing new programs (such as new ships for the Royal Navy). The 
decision to acquire Polaris missiles certainly did provide nuclear systems to 
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the UK, at least in theory. There were persistent rumours that Britain was not 
an autonomous nuclear power because a Washington agreement and 
double-key procedure were limiting the use of British nuclear weapons: 
“during the period from mid-1958 to March 1962, the British government 
would have had to secure US permission and authorization to arm the more 
reliable half of the V-Bombers” (Bronk 2014: 994). Although these rumours 
have been denied by the British government, they were revived each time 
the British had to renew its systems. Conventional forces were not in a much 
better state. Since the 1960’s Britain no longer had any modern aircraft 
carriers, which is quite problematic already for a great power, but it is even 
more problematic due to the image of the Royal Navy.4 An aircraft carrier 
is considered to be a visible instrument of a state’s power (for example : a 
US aircraft carrier sailing through the Strait of Taiwan helped de-escalate 
the tension between Taiwan and China in 1996). Due to the psychological 
impact linked to the possession of an aircraft carrier and its military power 
and value, it is not surprising that Henry Kissinger (when he was US Secretary 
of State) always opened an emergency session with the sentence “where 
are the carriers?” (Holloway III 2007). The embarrassing combination of 
military and economic weaknesses, of military and diplomatic humiliations, 
and of a global British disengagement from world affairs, has made foreign 
diplomats ask their British counterparts the question “what has happened to 
your country?” (McCourt 2011: 1618). Last but not least, once the Falklands 
have been invaded, Britain suffered another humiliation through its military. 
Indeed, once the small British Garrison surrendered, they were humiliated 
by the Argentinians by being forced to lay on the ground, face on the 
ground and pictures were taken of them in this position. These pictures 
were released. This has been perceived as outrageous by the British, and 
Thatcher mentioned this surrender in her speech at the House of Commons 
in which she emphasized that Royal Marines fought well “in the pure 
tradition” of British forces, and that ultimately, British armed forces will have 
the opportunity to take revenge on this humiliation (Thatcher 1982a). 
4 The Invincible class commissioned in 1980 (HMS Invincible, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Illustrious) weighed 22,000 tones and 
could carry only 22 STOVL aircraft. There are two types of aircraft carriers. The first one is called CATOBAR (catapulted 
assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery) and the second one is called STOVL (short take-off and vertical landing). 
The first type is considered more efficient because the aircrafts are launched by a steam catapult, they can carrier 
more armament and fuel. Whereas in the second type, aircrafts need to be lighter in order to be able to take off 
without help, therefore they can carry fewer munitions and fuel, their autonomy is less important. Possessing an aircraft 
carrier is considered as the ultimate display of a country’s prestige and influence as the former head of the Royal Navy 
Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope said: “to put it simply, countries that aspire to strategic international influence have aircraft 
carriers” (BBC News 2012).
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The symbolic (inappropriate) signal sent by decommissioning HMS 
Endurance: the UK further in retreat?
The Falklands issue raised concern about British resolve and commitment, 
because of the perceived gap between the official positions and the 
policies taken. Officially, the British position regarding the Falklands was 
no sovereignty transfer. In 1979 Thatcher annotated a report from Lord 
Carrington (the Foreign Minister), in which Carrington explained that, the 
best solution regarding the Falklands would be to proceed to a sovereignty 
transfer to Argentina. Next to the proposition, Thatcher annotated: “I could 
not possibly agree” (Carrington 1979). However opposite signals were 
sent: in the meantime, the defense budget was decreased, the Royal 
Navy’s tasks concentrated on hunting Soviet submarines in the North 
Atlantic, and HMS Endurance was decommissioned. HMS Endurance is 
an ice patrol ship, which has zero military value but was he only ship the 
Royal Navy permanently deployed in the Falklands, withdrawing and 
decommissioning it gave the impression that Britain was slowly retreating 
from this region. This decision raised some concerns among British politicians 
as recalled by Lord Carrington: ”I remain concerned at the strength of 
public and Parliamentary opposition to HMS Endurance’s withdrawal and 
at consequences for our position on the Falklands” (Carrington 1982). 
Stopping once for all humiliations and status denial; sending a 
strong signal to the world: “we are back in control”
Going to war for the Falklands to send an appropriate signal about 
British great power status.
Sending the entire Royal Navy to the Falklands was a very risky decision. 
Nothing could have predicted nor guaranteed a British success. The 
islands are 13,000 km from Britain and the nearest supply port and airport 
Britain could use were at the Ascension islands, 6.000 km away from the 
Falklands, putting British strategic bombers out of range. Compared to the 
British, the Argentinians would operate at “only” 700 km from their bases. 
Winning a war in these conditions would certainly restore British prestige 
in the world. It would first prove that Britain has the capacity to project its 
hard power far away, but demonstrated it also had the financial capacity 
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and resolve to do so: it has to be remembered that the decision to send 
the Royal Navy had been taken very quickly. The islands were invaded 
on 2 April and the task force sailed three days later, on 5 April. As the 
UK was considered to be in decline, a victory in the Falklands would be 
considered as an astonishing achievement and would surely make the 
entire world forget about the Suez fiasco and restore the image of a 
strong and victorious United Kingdom. 
It seems that British politicians were conscious that the Falklands crisis 
was the perfect opportunity to restore British credibility as a great power, 
before, during and after the deployment of British forces. Before the 
Argentine invasion, Robert Armstrong, the Secretary of the Cabinet, 
wrote a minute to Margaret Thatcher in which he argued that the way 
Britain would settle the Falklands dispute would be decisive for British 
status and prestige: “a British readiness to surrender sovereignty over the 
Falklands Islands might have implications for the British position elsewhere 
in the world [....]. What would the international reactions be if the UK 
showed itself willing to negotiate with the Argentines over sovereignty 
of the Falklands Islands? Would this be regarded as another example of 
enlightened statesmanship, or simply another sign that GB is on the skids?” 
(Armstrong 1980). This note is very interesting because it is annotated by 
Thatcher and she underlined the last proposition, making clear that, to 
her, a retreat from the Falklands would be interpreted by the international 
community as a display of weakness. After the departure of the fleet, 
Members of Parliament also made the argument that the Falklands 
crisis would determine British future international standing. For example, 
Member of Parliament Winston Churchill (the grandson of the WWII Prime 
Minister) declared that failing to re-conquer the Falklands “would have 
repercussion […]. Britain’s standing and credibility in the world […] will 
be judged by the resolution and determination with which we meet this 
challenge […]” (HC Deb 7 April 1982, vol 21 cc 959-1052). And after the 
conflict, the argument that the victory in the Falklands reestablished Britain 
as a great power was repeatedly used by Thatcher in her speeches and 
in her autobiography: “our country has won a great victory and we are 
entitled to be proud [...]. Britain [still is] the nation that built an Empire and 
ruled a quarter of the world” (Thatcher 1982c). She continued in praising 
what made Britain special compared to other countries: “the British are 
competent, courageous and resolute” [...] The lesson of the Falklands is 
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that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling 
qualities which shine through our history”.5
Showing British commitment to great power status commitment: 
defending international law principles by going to war against 
Argentina.
According to the definition of great power status, a great power has 
special duties and roles to perform. An expected duty from great powers 
is to manage the international system and thus to enforce the principles 
ruling it (Dafoe et al. 2014; Morris 2011). Two arguments evoking the duties 
of great powers were used by Britain to justify their decision to go to war: 
(1) defending the right of people to self-determination, and (2) protecting 
democracy from dictatorship. 
(1) One can find reference to the right of people to self-determination 
in Thatcher’s speeches before she became Prime Minister. In 1977, she 
was in the Shadow Cabinet and challenged the Labour government on 
its position regarding the Falklands during a Shadow Cabinet discussion 
the 23 February: “we should press the Foreign Secretary on his intentions 
and support the wish of the Islanders to remain British” (Shadow Cabinet 
1977). “The wishes of the Falklands islanders are paramount” is one of the 
most frequently cited sentences by Thatcher. She used this expression in 
private as well as during public intervention. A good example of that is of 
her speech on 3 March 1982 in the House of Commons: “the people of 
the Falkland Islands, like the people of the United Kingdom, are an island 
race. They are few in number but they have the right to live in peace, to 
choose their own way of life and to determine their own allegiance. Their 
way of life is British; their allegiance is to the Crown. It is the wish of the 
British people and the duty of Her Majesty’s Government to do everything 
that we can to uphold that right”. She also reminds us of this position in her 
autobiography (Thatcher 1993: 175-176). Other British officials also referred 
to this position, such as the Falklands Governor Rex Hunt: “when he [the 
5 See also her autobiography for another formulation of the same argument: “the significance of the Falklands was 
enormous, both for Britain’s self-confidence and for our standing in the world. Since the Suez fiasco in 1956, the British 
Foreign policy had been one long retreat […] we had come to be seen by both friends and enemies as a nation, 
which lacked the will and the capability to defend its interests in peace, let alone in war. Victory in the Falklands 
changed that” (Thatcher 1993: 173-175). The importance the Falklands crisis had is emphasized by the place Thatcher 
dedicated to it in her autobiography (40 pages in total). This suggests that there was a before and after watershed in 
the Falklands for Britain.
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governor] left the Falklands, he said that the people were in tears. They do 
not want to be Argentinean” (Thatcher 1982a). 
(2) While the fleet was on its way to the Falklands, two resolutions were 
adopted by the UN Security Council: resolution 502 on 3 April and resolution 
505 on 26 May. The first one consisted of demanding from Argentina a 
complete withdrawal from the Falklands and the second one calling 
Britain and Argentina to agree on a ceasefire before negotiations could 
start. In this context, The British government declared that the first use of 
the fleet dispatched is to be used as diplomatic support as Cecil Parkinson 
wrote to the Conservative constituency chairman: “it is a test for the whole 
nation. [...] any diplomatic solution must safeguard the principle that the 
wishes of the islanders shall remain paramount” […] “the eyes of the world 
are now focused on the Falklands islands […] to see whether brute force 
or the rule of law will triumph. Whether naked aggression occurs it must 
be overcome” (Parkinson 1982).6 The fact that Argentina refused to follow 
resolution 502 and to evacuate the Falklands gave Britain the opportunity 
to take the role of the protector of international law and democracy 
against the aggression from authoritarianism (symbolized by Argentina). 
The rhetoric used by Thatcher reveals a clear description of the situation: 
“I’m standing up for the right of self-determination. I’m standing up for our 
territory. I’m standing up for our people. I’m standing up for international 
law. I’m standing up for all those territories - those small territories and 
peoples the world over - whom, if someone doesn’t stand up and say 
to an invader ‘enough, stop’, would be at risk”.7 In a telegram to Ronald 
Reagan she wrote in May 1982 , she saw the Falklands crisis as the 
continuation of the fight of democracy and freedom against dictatorship: 
“we shall fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so 
loyal to everything in which you and we believe” (Thatcher 1982b). 
She went further in the assimilation of the Falklands crisis to the 
fight for freedom and democracy against dictatorship by making 
an analogy to Munich (1938). In Munich, Neville Chamberlain 
sacrificed a large portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany to 
“save” the peace, or so he thought (Breuning 2007: 56). Thatcher identified 
6 The letter details Thatcher’s motives to send the Royal Navy to the Falklands. Cecil Parkinson is at that time junior trade 
minister and a member of the war cabinet during the crisis.
7 About Thatcher clear-cutting understanding of the world see Stephen Benedict Dyson (2009: 40-41), Antony King 
(1985: 132) and Francis Pym (1984).
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herself as being in the same situation as Chamberlain, but this time Britain 
would not step down as the US Secretary of State Haig wrote after a 
meeting with Thatcher: “she rapped sharply on the tabletop and recalled 
that this was the table at which Neville Chamberlain sat in 1938 and 
spoke of Czechoslovakia as a faraway people about we know so little”. 
Recalling that this omission had led to the eventual “death of 45 million 
people, she identified the Argentine challenge as a repeat performance” 
(Young 1989: 72) and compared Galtieri to Hitler: “a common or garden 
dictator should rule over the Queen’s subjects and prevail by fraud and 
violence? Not while I was Prime Minister” (Thatcher 1993: 181). 
Conclusion
This paper aimed to highlight the importance of an often disregarded 
argument to explain causes of war: considerations for status and prestige. 
Evidence supporting the argument that Britain re-conquered the 
Falklands to save its great power status can be found in the declassified 
documents. This article also aimed to make studies based on analysis 
of primary sources more popular, or at least to make such studies be 
more widely considered in the academic field. Declassified documents 
are unique sources for researches as they provide authentic insights on 
decision-making processes. In this article, I have followed a qualitative 
discourse analysis path. It would be very interesting to continue the analysis 
of the Falklands case study, but next time by using these documents for 
a quantitative study. A quantitative study would enable us measure 
and to make comparisons between lexicon fields referring to prestige 
considerations, domestic politics concerns and strategic concerns, to 
ascertain which one is the most prominent. 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
149
Bibliography
Abdelal, R., Herrera, Y., Johnston, A. I., McDermott, R., 2009. Measuring 
identity. A guide for social scientist. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Adkin, M., 1995. Goose Green. London: Orion Paperbacks.
Armstrong, R., 1980. Falkland Islands (OD(80) 46). [Minute] PM’s office files, 
PREM 19/656 f82, Kew: The National Archives. Available at: http://
www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122466 (Accessed 17 
September 2016).
Arquilla, J., Rasmussen, M., 2001. The origins of the South Atlantic war. 
Journal of Latin American Studies, 33(4): 739-775.
Aron, R., 1962. Paix et guerre entre les nation. Paris: Calmann-Lévy [2004].
Badie, B., 2013. L’impuissance de la puissance. Paris: CNRS Editions.
Barnett, M., Duvall, R., 2005. Power in International Politics. International 
Organization, 59(1): 39-75
Baron, J., 2013. Great power peace ad American primacy. The origine and 
future of a new international order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
BBC News, 2012, Aircraft carriers crucial, Royal Navy chief warns. BBC 
News, 4 July [online]. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-
18706505 (Accessed 17 March 2017).
Bluth, C., 1987. The British resort to force in the Falklands/Malvinas conflict 
1982: international law and just war theory. Journal of Peace 
Reasearch, 24(1): 5-20.
Bukovansky, M., Clark, I., Eckersley, R., Price, R., Reus-Smit, C., Wheeler, N., 
2012. Special responsibilities: global problems and America power. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bronk, J., 2014. Britain’s “independent” V-bomber force and US nuclear 
weapons, 1957-1962. Journal of Strategic Studies, 37(6-7): 974-997.
Brown, C., 2004. Do great powers have great responsibilties? Great powers 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
150
and moral agency. Global Society, 18(1): 5-19.
Calvert, P., 1983. Sovereignty and the Falklands crisis. International Affaires, 
59(3): 405-413.
Calvert, P., 1982. The rights and the wrongs. New York: Saint Martin’s Press.
Carrington, P., 1979. Falkland Islands. [Minute], PM’s office files, PREM 
19/656 f118, Kew: The National Archives. Available at: http://
www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122458 (Accessed 16 
September 2016).
Carrington, P., 1982. HMS Endurance. [Minute], FCO files, ALA 062/2, Kew: 
The National Archives. Available at: http://www.margaretthatcher.
org/document/118422 (Accessed 17 September 2016).
Chassaigne, P., 2009. La Grande-Bretagne et le monde de 1815 à nos 
jours. Paris: Armand Colin.
Dafoe, A., Rensthen, J., and Huth, P., 2014. Reputation and status as 
motives for war. Annual Review of Political Science, 17: 371-393. 
Dahl, R., 1957. The concept of Power. Systems Research Behavioral 
Science, 2(3): 201-215.
Darwin, J., 2009. The Empire project. The rise and fall of the British world-
system, 1830-1970. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
de Waal-Andrews, W., Gregg, A., Lammers, J., 2015. When status is 
grabbed and when status is granted: getting ahead in dominance 
and prestige hierarchies. British Journal of Social Psychology, 54: 
445-464.
Dillon, G., 1989. The Falklands: Politics and War. London: Macmillan.
Donghy, A., 2014. the British Government and the Falklands Islands, 1974-
1979. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Falkland Islands Government, 2013. Results of the referendum on the Political 
Status of the Falkland Islands. 12 March [Press release],. Available 
at http://www.falklands.gov.fk/results-of-the-referendum-on-the-
political-status-of-the-falkland-islands/ (Accessed 6 July 2017).




o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
151
Forsberg, T., Heller, R. and Wolf, R., 2014. Russia and the quest for status. 
Communist and Post-communist Studies, 47: 261-268.
Franck, T., 1983. Dulce et decorum est: the strategic role of legal principles 
in the Falklands war. The American Journal of International Relations, 
77(11): 109-124.
Freedman, L., 1982. The war of the Falklands Islands. Foreign Affairs, 61(1): 
196-210.
Freedman, L., 1983. Britain and the Falklands war. Oxford: Basil Blackwell 
Inc.
Gamba, V., 1987. The Falklands/Malvinas War. A model for North-South 
crisis prevention. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.
Gochman, C. S. and Maoz, Z., 1984. Militarized interstate disputes, 1816-
1976: procedures, patterns, and insights. The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, 28(4): 585-616.
Haig, A., 1984. Caveat: realism, Reagan and foreign policy. New York: 
Scribner.
Hastings, M. and Jenkins, S., 1983. The battle for the Falklands. New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company.
Howard, M., 1971. Studies in war and peace. New York: Viky.
Jackson, R., 2000. The global covenant. Human conduct in a world of 
states. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Jervis, R., 1976. Perception and misperception in international politics. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
King, A., 1985. The British Prime Minister. London: MacMillan
Kinney, D., 1990. National interest/national honor: the diplomacy of the 
Falklands crisis, Westport: Greenwodd Press.
Lake, D., 2009. Hierarchy in international relations. Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press.
Lawrence, J. and Lawrence, R., 1988. When the fighting is over. 
Tumbledown. A personal story. London: Bloomsburry Publishing PLC.
Lebow, R. N., 1983. Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: the origines of the 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
152
Falkland War. Journal of Strategic Studies, 6(1): 5-35.
Lebow, R. N., 2008. A cultural theory of international relations. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Lebow, R. N., 2010. Why nations fight. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Legro, J. W., 2005. Rethinking the world. Great powers strategies and 
international order. London: Cornell University Press.
Levy, J., 1983. War in the Modern Great power System 1495-1975. Lexington: 
The University Press of Kentucky.
Levy, J. and Vakili, L., 1992. Diversionary action by authoritarian regimes: 
Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas case. In: Midlarsky, M. ed. The 
Internationalization of Communal Stripe. New York: Routledge. pp. 
118-146.
Lindemann, T., 2010. Causes of War, the struggle for recognition. 
Colchester: ECPR.
Llyod, T. O., 1984. The British empire, 1558-1983. New York: Oxford University 
Press.
Love, T. and Davis, J., 2014. The effect of status on role-taking accurency. 
American Sociological Review, 79(5): 848-865.
Lukes, S., 1974. Power: a radical view, London: Macmillan Press. 
Marsh, S., 2012. Anglo-American relations 1950-1951: three strikes for British 
prestige. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 23: 304-330.
Marshall, T., 1977. Class citizenship and social development: essays. 
Chicago: Chicago University Press. 
Marx, R., 1993. Histoire de l’Angleterre. Paris: Editions Arthème Fayard.
McCourt, D., 2011. Role-playing and identity formation in international 
politics: Britain’s reinvasion of the Falklands, 1982. Review of 
International Politics, 37: 1599-1621.
MacCourt, D., 2014. Britain and world power since 1945. Constructing a 




o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
153
Mearsheimer, J., 2014. Tragedy of great power politics. New York: Norton 
and Company.
Méndez, N., 1993. Malvinas: ésta es la historia. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana.
Menédez, M., 1983. Malvinas: testimonio de su gobernador. Buenos Aires: 
Sudamericana.
Middlebrook, M., 1989. The Fight for the Malvinas. London: Penguin. 
Middlebrook, M., 1985. Operation Corporate: the story of the Falklands 
war, 1982. New York: The Viking Press.
Modelski, G. and Morgan, P., 1985. Understanding global war. Journal of 
Conflict resolution, 29(3): 391-417.
Morris, J., 2011. How great is Britain? Powers, responsibility and Britain’s 
future global role. The British Journal of Politics and International 
Relations, 13: 326-347.
Onea, T., 2014. Between dominance and decline: status anxiety and 
great power rivalry. Review of International Studies, 40: 125-152.
O’Neill, B., 2001. Honor, symbols and war. Ann Arbor: the University of 
Michigan Press.
Parkinson, C., 1982. Letter to Conservative constituency chairmen, MPs 
and others (Falklands crisis). [Briefing note], THCR 2/11/1/34 f3, 
Cambridge: Churchill Archive Centre. Available at: http://www.
margaretthatcher.org/document/123620 (Accessed 15 September 
2016).
Parliamentary Archives, HC Deb 07 April 1982 vol 21 cc959-1052. Available 
at: http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1982/apr/07/
falkland-islands (Accessed 17 September 2016).
Paul, T. V., Welch Larson, D. and Wolhforth, W. C. eds., 2014. Status in world 
politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Perl, R. and Larson, E., 1983. The Falklands dispute in international law and 
politics: a documentary sourcebook. Oceana Publication.
Piaggi, I., 1998. El combate de Goose Green. Buenos Aires: Planeta.
Pym, F., 1984. The Politics of consent. London: Hamisch Hamilton
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
154
Ragim, C. C., 1987. The comparative method: moving beyong qualitative 
and quantitative strategies. Bekerley: University of California Press.
Robbins, K., 1994. The Eclipse of a great power. Modern Britain 1970-1992. 
London: Longman.
Rotberg, J. and Rubb, T. eds., 1984. The origins and preventions of major 
wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rothstein, R., 1968. Alliances and small powers. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Sanders, D., 1990. Losing an Empire: finding a role. British foreign policy 
since 1945. London: Macmillan.
Saurette, P., 2006. You dissin me ? Humiliations and post 9/11 global 
politics. Review of International Studies, 32(3): 495-522.
Scott, H. M., 2006. The birth of a Great power system 1740-1815. Harlow: 
Pearson Education Limited.
Sewell, B. and Ryan, M. eds., 2017. Foreign policy at the periphery. The 
shifting margins of US international relations since world war II. 
Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky.
Shadow Cabinet, 1977. Leader’s consultative committee, Minutes to 
the 152nd committee, House of Commons, 23 February 1977. 
Available at: http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109713 
(Accessed 14 September 2016). 
Sharp, P., 2016. Thatcher’s diplomacy. The revival of British foreign policy. 
London: Plagrave McMillan.
Schmitt, M. and Green, L., 1985. The Falklands crisis and the laws of war. 
International Law Studies, 70: 203-213.
Snyder, G. H. and Diesing, P., 1977. Conflict among nations. Bargaining, 
decision making and system structure in international crises. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Sobek, D., 2007. Rallying around the podesta: testing diversionary theory 
accross time. Journal of Peace Research, 40(1): 29-45.
Thatcher, M., 1982a. Falkland Islands. Speech to the House of 
Commons, Hansard HC [21/633-38]. Available at: http://hansard.
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
155
millbanksystems.com/commons/1982/apr/03/falkland-islands 
(Accessed 17 February 2017).
Thatcher, M., 1982b. MT expresses serious concerns about US/Peruvian 
peace proposals; proposes amendments. [Telegram] THCR 2/1/21 
f24 (T97/82), Cambridge: Churchill Archive Centre. Available at: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/122864 [Accessed 
15 September 2016].
Thatcher, M. 1982c. Speech to the conservative rally at Chelthenham. 
[online], 3 July 1982, Cheltenham Racecourse. Available at: https://
www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989 (Accessed 15 
September 2016). 
Thatcher, M., 1993. The Downing street years. London: Hayer Collins 
publishers.
Thompson, J., 1992. No picnic. London: Cassel.
Volgy, T. J., Corbetta, R., Grant, K. A. and Baird, R. G., 2011. Major powers 
and the quest for status in international politics. Global and regional 
perspectives. New York: Palgrave McMillan.
Waltz, K., 1968. International structure, national force, and the balance 
of world power. In: Farrel, J. and Smith, A., Theory and relaity in 
international relations. New York: Columbia University Press. pp. 31-47.
Waltz, K., 1979. Theory of International politics. London: Addison-Wesley.
Weinberger, C., 1990. Fighting for peace: seven years in the Pentagon. 
New York: Grand Central Publishing.
Welch, D., 1997. Remember the Falklands? Missed lessons of a 
misunderstood conflict. International Journal, summer 1997: 483-
508.
Welch, D., 2005. Painful Choices. A theory of foreign policy change. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Welch Larson, D. and Schevchenko, A., 2010. Status, Identity, And 
Rising Powers. Paper presented at the CIPSS/CEPSI Workshop on 
International Security and Political Economy, McGill University. 
Williams, P., 1983. Miscalculation, crisis management and the Falklands 
Vol.XV
III, N
o. 66 - 2012
XXIII (79) - 2017
156
conflict. The World Today, 39(4): 144-149.
Windsor, P., 1983. Diplomatic dimensions of the Falklands Crisis. Millennium: 
Journal of International Studies, 12(1): 88-96.
Woodward, J., 1992. One hundred day: the memoirs of the battle group 
commanders. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Young, H., 1989. A biography of Margaret Thatcher. London: Macmillan
Matthieu Grandpierron (matthieu.grandpierron@polytechnique.edu) 
is a PhD candidate at Ecole Polytechnique, University Paris-
Saclay and at the University of Ottawa. His PhD dissertation 
is about how status recognition and conceptions of power 
of decision-makers have shaped great powers’ interventions 
in their periphery. His research interests are: great powers’ 
wars, status recognition, China’s foreign policy, and nuclear 
deterrence. Beside his researches, Matthieu Grandpierron 
lectures about international relations and comparative 
political institutions at Paris VIII Vincennes Saint-Denis, and at 
Institut Catholique d’Etudes Supérieures (ICES). 
